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ABSTRACT 
There is a low risk of detection for white-collar criminals in most nations. White-collar 
criminals in public procurement corruption are probably no exception. Public procurement 
appears particularly vulnerable to corruption despite the multitude of policies and procedures 
that most public organizations have in place to ensure proper stewardship of public funds. 
While these mechanisms are designed to control and make transparent the procurement 
process, corruption has been inherent in public procurement since governments first began 
buying goods and services. This article presents the topics of white-collar crime, public 
procurement corruption, and detection by whistleblowers. Based on a sample of 390 
convicted white-collar criminals in Norway from 2009 to 2014, this article explores sources 
of detection with an emphasis on whistleblowing. It seems that whistleblowers are the single 
most important source of detection. Based on conflict theory, there is a need to strengthen the 
role of whistleblowers and prevent them from revenge and retaliation. 
Keywords: public corruption, whistleblowing, crime detection, procurement, social conflict 
theory. 
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1 Introduction 
White-collar criminals are individuals who commit financial crime in a professional setting 
were they have legal access and hide misconduct in legitimate transactions. Corruption is a 
white-collar crime involving two parties. White-collar corruption in public procurement is 
characterized by a public official who is offered or asks for an unreasonable favor from 
outside vendors, often in return for a special treatment of the supplier (Ksenia, 2008; Passas, 
2007). 
Corruption scandals involving public officials are regularly presented in the media in the 
United States and many other countries. For example, former middle manager in the 
technology department in the District of Columbia, Yusuf Acar, was sentenced to 27 months 
prison for corruption (Sidley, 2010). Another example is former major John Lee Cockerham 
who was sentenced to 17 and ½ years in prison for corruption (Thompson and Schmitt, 2007). 
It is an interesting question whether detected corrupt public officials are only the tip of an 
iceberg. If they are, there is certainly a need to address the issue of detection sources. One 
detection source is whistleblowers who are former or current organizational members 
disclosing misconduct and crime under the control of their employers (Stieger, 2012; Vadera 
et al., 2009). 
This article addresses the following research question: What is the role of whistleblowers in 
detection of white-collar corruption in public procurement? Based on a sample of convicted 
white-collar criminals in Norway, the objective of this article is to present research results on 
the role of whistleblowers. 
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Procurement is highly susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse (Hunsaker, 2009). While public 
service motivation theory argues that some individuals work in the public sector based on 
values different from people in the private sector (Kjeldsen and Jacobsen, 2013; Perry et al., 
2010), opportunity theory suggests that wherever there is an opportunity for financial gain, 
many will be tempted as long as the risk of detection is low (Benson and Simpson, 2014). 
 
2 White-Collar Criminals 
A white-collar criminal is typically a member of the privileged socioeconomic classes in 
society (Sutherland, 1949) who is involved in illegal activities and commits nonviolent acts 
for financial gain (Gottschalk, 2014). The white-collar criminal is a person of respectability 
who commits crime in a professional setting, where criminal activities are concealed and 
disguised in organizational work by law-abiding behavior (Pontell et al., 2014). The criminal 
has power and influence, he forms relationships with other persons or professionals, which 
protects him from developing a criminal identity, and he enjoys trust from others in privileged 
networks (Benson and Simpson, 2014). White-collar crime refers to offenses committed in an 
organization by those who indulge in dishonest activities – either by themselves or using 
agents – for financial gain (Schoepfer et al., 2014).  
Law enforcement targeted at white-collar criminals is non-aggressive and often discrete not 
only because of the upper class affiliation. Another reason is white-collar defendants’ ability 
to recruit top defense lawyers who apply symbolic defense in addition to substance defense, 
as well as information control, in their work for white-collar clients (Gottschalk, 2014). It is 
recognized that having a well-qualified and possibly famous attorney increases one’s chances 
of a favorable outcome in any legal dispute. Some individual white-collar offenders avoid 
criminal prosecution because of the class bias of the courts (Tombs and Whyte, 2003).  
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When white-collar criminals appear before their sentencing judges, they can correctly claim to 
be first-time offenders. According to Slyke and Bales (2013), theory and empirical research 
often have agreed that white-collar offenders benefit from leniency at the sentencing stage of 
criminal justice system processing. Croall (2007) argues that the term “crime” is contentious, 
as many of the harmful activities of businesses or occupational elites are not subject to 
criminal law and punishment but administrative or regulatory law and penalties and sanctions. 
Therefore, very few white-collar criminals seem to be put on trial, and even fewer higher-
class criminals are sentenced to imprisonment. Another reason for the low prosecution and 
conviction rate for white-collar criminals is the extraordinary broadly and fuzzy defined 
offenses in criminal law for white-collar crime (Hasnas et al., 2010). 
 
3 Public Procurement Corruption 
To detect, investigate, prosecute, and otherwise combat and prevent white-collar crime is a 
challenge in most countries all over the world. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, 
2015) characterize white-collar crime as the full range of frauds committed by business and 
government professionals. Fraud is a general type of crime that involves using deception for 
illegal monetary gain. White-collar crime includes violations of law committed by both 
individuals and organizations. White-collar offenders generally are recognized as those in 
high-status positions, including positions of trust. Public corruption is one form of white-
collar crime that involves a breach of trust or an abuse of position by federal, state, or local 
government officials (Cordis, 2014). In general, white-collar offenses may be handled through 
the criminal justice system, the civil system, or through regulatory means. 
Public corruption is one form of white-collar crime that involves a breach of trust or an abuse 
of position by federal, state, or local government officials. In 2015, the National Institute of 
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Justice (2015) supports research related to public corruption. FBI (2015) states that public 
corruption is their top priority among criminal investigations, and for good reason: 
Public corruption poses a fundamental threat to our national security and way of life. It 
impacts everything from how well our borders are secured and our neighborhoods 
protected…to verdicts handed down in courts…to the quality of our roads, schools, 
and other government services. And it takes a significant toll on our pocketbooks, 
wasting billions in tax dollars every year. The FBI is singularly situated to combat this 
corruption, with the skills and capabilities to run complex undercover operations and 
surveillance. 
Cordis (2014) studied public corruption in the United States. She studied the relation between 
corruption and the composition of state government spending. Her analysis reveals that 
corruption lowers the share of government spending devoted to higher education and raises 
the share of spending devoted to other and non-allocable budget items.  
Elite public criminals can use the power and apparent legitimacy of their office to extort 
bribes or direct procurement to entities they control or from which they profit. They can shape 
the environment by organizing procurement processes and formulating regulatory 
requirements. Private elites can indirectly achieve the same profitable result by suborning 
public officials to modify the environment to benefit the private party, for example by going 
to a non-bid, sole-source market (Passas, 2007). 
Some of the approaches applied in the private sector to combat corruption include corporate 
social responsibility programs (Eadie and Raffert, 2014), business process reengineering 
(Bertolini et al., 2015), and e-procurement programs (Mahallik, 2014). These approaches are 
adaptable to the public sector. 
Financial crime by white-collar criminals can be classified into four categories (Gottschalk, 
2010): fraud, theft, manipulation, and corruption. Corruption can be defined as the giving, 
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offering, promising,  requesting, receiving, taking, agreeing to taking, or accepting of an 
improper advantage in terms of money or other consideration related to position, office, or 
assignment (Boles, 2014). The improper advantage does not have to be connected to a 
specific action or to not doing this action. It is sufficient if the advantage can be linked to a 
person’s position, office, or assignment. An individual or group is guilty of corruption if they 
accept money or money’s worth for doing something that they are under a duty to do anyway 
or that they are under a duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper 
reason (Ksenia, 2008). Corruption is to destroy or pervert the integrity or fidelity of a person 
in his discharge of duty, it is to induce to act dishonestly or unfaithfully, it is to make venal, 
and it is to bribe. Both the bribed and the briber are criminals in most legislations, such as the 
United States and Western Europe. In some countries, only the receiver of a bribe is 
considered and treated as a criminal. 
Transparency International (2014) defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. In the case of public corruption discussed below, private gain is interpreted 
widely to include gains accruing to the government official, his or her family members, close 
friends, political party, favorite charity, hometown or a corporate or other entity in which the 
official or the official’s family or close friends have a financial or social interest. A public 
official is any officer or employee of government, including legislators and judges, and any 
person participating as juror, advisor, consultant, or otherwise, in performing a governmental 
function (Boles, 2014). 
Cordis and Milyo (2013) do also define corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain, and public corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain, or more broadly as 
an abuse of public trust. They include, for example, postal employees charged with theft of 
mail. Their definition seems to include almost all kinds of financial crime and is thus not 
useful in our context. In their table of U.S. code titles for lead charge, the most relevant titles 
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seem to be Paragraph 201 Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, Paragraph 641 Public 
Money, Property or Records, and Paragraph 666 Theft/Bribery in Programs Receiving Federal 
Funds. 
Corruption is a concealed abuse of a position of trust by an expectation that one will do what 
one is relied on to do (Boles, 2014). From an economic perspective, corruption generally is 
defined as the misuse of a position of authority for private or personal benefit, where misuse 
typically constitutes a breach of legal norms. Corruption is expected to occur where (1) there 
is a control over economic benefits and costs and, thus, the potential for economic rents – that 
is, profits, and (2) persons in positions of authority have discretion over the allocation of such 
benefits and costs. Corruption can reflect rational, self-interested behavior by persons using 
their discretion to direct allocations to themselves or to other social actors who offer rewards 
in return for favorable discretionary treatment (Misangyi et al., 2008). 
In corruption, an external opportunity can supply benefits to solve a problem. Typically, a 
problem is solved by providing benefits to persons in positions of authority. According to 
Misangyi et al. (2008), the rational choice perspective on corruption assumes that corruption 
is a response to situations that present opportunities for gain and the discretionary power to 
appropriate that gain. Corruption involves behavior on the part of officials in the public or 
private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close 
to them, or induce others to do so by misusing the position in which they are placed.  
Corruption covers a wide range of illegal activities, such as kickbacks, embezzlement, and 
extortion. Kayrak (2008) includes money laundering as well in his definition of corruption, 
which is too wide for our research purpose. 
The notion of corruption may be classified as sporadic or systemic corruption, bureaucratic or 
political corruption, grand or petty corruption, personal or organizational corruption, and 
active and passive corruption. For example, Lange (2008) defines organizational corruption as 
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the pursuit of individual interests by one or more organizational actors through the intentional 
misdirection of organizational resources or perversion of organizational routines, which is 
commonly understood to be highly undesirable for any parties holding a stake in the 
organization’s performance.  
Pinto et al. (2008) focused on two fundamental dimensions of corruption in organizations, that 
is, whether the individual or the organization is the beneficiary of the corrupt activity, and 
whether the corrupt behavior is undertaken by an individual actor or by two or more actors. 
While an organization of corrupt individuals is a scaling up of personally beneficial corrupt 
behaviors to the organization level, a corrupt organization consists of a group of employees 
carrying out corrupt behaviors on behalf of the organization. This is similar to a distinction 
between bribed and briber, where the bribed is an individual beneficiary of the corruption, 
while the briber is an organizational beneficiary of the corruption. 
Bowman and Gilligan (2008) suggest that corruption may be a greater issue for the Australian 
public than has been assumed in the past, given the relatively low level of reported systematic 
corruption in Australia. Moreover, while there may be widespread agreement that corruption 
in Australia is harmful and perhaps inevitable, people can find it difficult at times to 
differentiate between what is corrupt and what is not. 
Public corruption is defined as corruption involving public officials. Section 201 of Title 18 of 
the United States Code governs the offenses of bribery and illegal gratuity. Relevant 
definitions are set forth in § 2011. To prove corruption, the government must generally 
establish that: (i) a thing of value was given, offered, or promised to (or, in the case of a 
recipient, demanded, sought, received, or accepted by); (ii) a present or future public official, 
(iii) for an official act; (iv) with corrupt intent or intent to influence (or be influenced). 
Corruption requires proof of intent (Dwyer et al., 2014). 
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4 Detection by Whistleblowers 
A city manager told us that corruption in procurement happens every day and that when he 
first started with the town, the FBI was already investigating the public works director and a 
purchasing director. We asked him how the FBI knew to investigate, and he said it was 
someone inside the organization or maybe people just talking outside of work. That is the 
difficulty in the detection – you really have to depend on people within the organization to 
blow the whistle. Auditors could also be relevant, but they may only be called in after a 
complaint or report has been filed.  
In the United States it is possible to make money by blowing the whistle. A whistle blower 
can get a share of the retrieved and recovered sum of money. In 2014, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) paid $30 million in a whistleblower award. It was the largest 
award so far, and the reporter wrote: “Blowing the whistle is increasingly worth big bucks”. 
The SEC did not identify the tipster, where he or she is from or the case this award was tied 
to. Andrew Ceresney, director of the SEC’s enforcement division, said in a statement that 
“this whistleblower came to us with information about an ongoing fraud that would have been 
very difficult to detect” (Ensign, 2014). The Office of the Whistleblower at SEC 
(www.sec.gov/whistleblowers) is authorized by congress to provide monetary awards to 
eligible individuals who come forward with high-quality original information. 
Public whistleblowers are not entitled to awards. Stieger (2012) argues that offering monetary 
rewards to public whistleblowers represents a proposal for attacking public corruption at its 
source. He suggests offering a carrot: if a public official reports a bribe offer, leading to the 
conviction of the offeror, the state will pay the reporting official the full amount of the offered 
bribe. By tying the amount of the reward to the amount of the bribe, any financial incentive 
the official would have to take the bribe is removed. 
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According to Kaplan et al. (2011), employee tips are the most common form of initial fraud 
detection, suggesting that employees frequently are aware of fraud before others 
professionally charged to detect fraud, such as internal and external auditors. The willingness 
of employees, who learn about fraud, to report this information, varies with several factors. 
For example, if the executive, to whom misconduct should be reported, is not trusted, 
employees will tend not to report. Whistleblowing decisions are dependent on information, 
trust, security, predictability, self-confidence, job security and organizational culture in 
general.  
Johnson (2005) has the following definition of whistleblowing: 
Whistle blowing is a distinct form of dissent consisting of four elements: (1) the 
person acting must be a member or former member of the organization at issue; (2) his 
or her information must be about nontrivial wrongdoing in that organization; (3) he or 
she must intend to expose the wrongdoing, and (4) he or she must act in a way that 
makes the information public. 
Vadera et al. (2009) has the following definition of whistleblowing: 
Whistle blowing is the disclosure by organizational members (former or current) of 
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to 
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.  
Atwater (2006) defines whistleblowing as an act by which an individual reveals wrongdoing 
within an organization to those in positions of authority or to the public, with hopes of 
rectifying the situation. 
Vadera et al. (2009) identified the following characteristics of whistleblowers and 
whistleblowing: 
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• Federal whistle blowers were motivated by concern for public interest, were high 
performers, reported high levels of job security, job achievement, job commitment and 
job satisfaction, and worked in high performing work groups and organizations. 
• Anger at wrongful activities drove individuals to make internal reports to 
management. Retaliation by management shifted individuals’ focus away from 
helping their organizations or victims and toward attaining retribution. 
• Whistle blowing was more likely when observers of wrongdoing held professional 
positions, had more positive reactions to their work, had longer service, were recently 
recognized for good performance, were male, were members of larger work groups, 
and were employed by organizations perceived by others to be responsive to 
complaints. 
• Whistle blowing was more frequent in the public sector than in the private. 
• Whistle blowing was strongly related to situational variables with seriousness of the 
offense and supportiveness of the organizational climate being the strongest 
determinants. 
• Inclination to report a peer for theft was associated with role responsibility, the 
interests of group members, and procedural perceptions. 
Zipparo (1999) identified the following two main factors, which deter public officials from 
reporting corruption: 
• Concern about not having enough proof 
• Absence of legal protection from negative consequences 
One of the more successful whistle-blowers is Michael Lissack. He worked as a banker at the 
Smith Barney brokerage. In 1995, he blew the whistle on a fraudulent scheme, known in 
municipal financing as “yield burning.” Dr. Lissack filed a whistleblower lawsuit against 
more than a dozen of Wall Street firms under the False Claims Act. In April 2000, 17 
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investment banks agreed to pay approximately $140 million dollars to settle charges that they 
defrauded the federal government by overpricing securities sold in connection with certain 
municipal bond transactions. The U.S. Government has recovered more than $250 million as 
the result of Dr. Lissack’s whistleblower action. His allegations have brought on more than a 
dozen of civil and criminal investigations by the SEC, IRS and the U.S. Department of 
Justice. Dr. Lissack has written editorials about whistleblowing for the New York Times and 
the Los Angeles Times, and has been profiled in many international publications, including 
the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, Fortune, Business Week, the Economist, and 
USA Today (www.whistleblowerdirectory.com). 
In 2001, Sherron Watkins, an employee in the American energy company Enron, notified her 
chief executive officer Kenneth Lay about a perceived accounting scandal. Watkins did so 
hoping Lay would act. He did not, and was later arrested due to his involvement in the 
wrongdoings, because she blew the whistle (Bendiktsson, 2010).  
Negative consequences after whistleblowing, suffered by some whistleblowers are labeled 
retaliation. Retaliation implies to take an undesirable action against a whistleblower – who 
reported wrongdoing internally or externally, outside the organization. Retaliation can be 
defined as taking adverse action against an employee for opposing an unlawful employment 
practice or participating in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing related to such a practice 
(Bjørkelo and Matthiesen, 2011). 
Thus, receivers of complaints and reports have two issues to consider when dealing with 
whistleblowers as an information source. First, not all that is said and not all accusations from 
a whistleblower is necessarily true. Therefore, information from a whistleblower has to be 
carefully checked and verified. Second, a whistleblower may be in danger of retaliation, 
making it a requirement for receivers to protect the whistleblower. Report receivers have to 
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make sure that a whistleblower contributing to an investigation does not experience negative 
consequences. 
The National Whistleblowers Center (NWC) in the United States lists a number of 
whistleblowers (www.whistleblowers.org). A few of them blew the whistle because of public 
procurement corruption. An example is Bunnatine Greenhouse who stood alone in opposing 
the approval of a highly improper multi-billion dollar no bid contract to Halliburton for the 
reconstruction of Iraq. In retaliation for her courage, she was removed from her position as the 
highest-ranking civilian contracting official of the Army Corps of Engineers. On June 27, 
2005, she testified to a congressional panel, alleging specific instances of waste, fraud and 
other abuses and irregularities by Halliburton with regard to its operation in Iraq since the 
2003 invasion. Vice President Dick Cheney had been the CEO of Halliburton. Criminal 
investigations into Halliburton were opened by the U.S. Justice Department, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Pentagon's inspector general. These investigations found no 
wrongdoing within the contract award and execution process.On July 25, 2011, the U.S. 
District Court in Washington, DC approved awarding Greenhouse $970,000 in full restitution 
of lost wages, compensatory damages and attorney fees. 
The Whistleblower Directory (www.whistleblowerdirectory.com) is a comprehensive 
database showcasing individuals who reported financial crime. An example is Jim Alderson 
who worked as an accountant for Quorum Health Services in Montana and a Chief Financial 
Officer at the Whitefish hospital. In 1992, he blew the whistle on the hospital’s fraudulent 
bookkeeping practices, wherein reimbursements were routinely sought after filing fraudulent 
cost reports with Medicare. In retaliation for his whistleblowing disclosure, Alderson was 
fired. He filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his former employer, Quorum Health Services, 
and its former owner, Hospital Corp. of America. Five years after Alderson filed the lawsuit, 
the federal government joined the case. In October 2000, Quorum settled the case. Under the 
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False Claims law, Alderson received $11.6 million dollars and Quorum paid a fine of $77.5 
million dollars. 
 
5 Research Methodology 
Our conceptual framework is detection sources for convicted white-collar criminals. To 
identify a substantial sample of white-collar criminals and to collect relevant information 
about detection sources, there are several options available. However, in a small country like 
Norway with a population of only five million people, available sample size is limited. One 
available option would be to study court cases involving white-collar criminals. A challenge 
here would be to identify relevant laws and sentences that correspond with our definition of 
not only white-collar crime, but also required characteristics of white-collar criminals. 
Another available option is to study newspaper articles, where the journalists have already 
conducted some form of selection of upper class, white-collar individuals convicted in court 
of financial crime. Another advantage of this approach is that the cases are publicly known, 
which makes it more acceptable to identify cases by individual white-collar names. Therefore, 
the latter option was chosen for this research.  
Based on this decision, our sample has the following characteristics applicable to newspaper 
reporting: famous individuals, famous companies, surprising stories, important events, 
substantial consequences, matters of principle and significant public interest. This is in line 
with research by Schnatterly (2003) who searched the Wall Street Journal for several years in 
her study of white-collar crime published in the Strategic Management Journal. Media often 
pick up examples of companies and their leaders by negative media coverage because of 
white-collar wrongdoings (Briscoe and Murphy, 2012).  
Verification of facts in newspaper accounts was carried out by obtaining court documents in 
terms of final verdicts. After registering newspaper accounts as an important indication of a 
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white-collar offender, the contents in newspaper articles were compared to and corrected by 
court sentences, which typically range from five to fifty pages in Norwegian district courts, 
courts of appeal and Supreme Court. Thus, we reduce the effects of counter measures by firms 
and individuals to cover up for their wrongdoings (Zavyalova et al., 2012). 
We only included cases where someone involved in the case was sentenced in court to 
imprisonment. For this study it was considered sufficient that the person was sentenced in one 
court, even if the person represented a recent case that still had appeals pending in higher 
courts. As the case developed, data were updated in our database. A sentence was defined as a 
prison sentence. Therefore, cases ending with fines only were not included in the sample.  
 
6 Research Results 
A total of 390 white-collar criminals were convicted in Norway from 2009 to 2015. 33 of 
these cases (8 percent) were concerned with white-collar corruption in public procurement as 
listed in Table 1. There are 7 cases where 33 offenders were involved. Table 1 lists what the 
corruption case was about, the name of convicted white-collar criminal, the offender’s 
position when committing the crime, and the sentence in court in terms of number of years 
imprisonment. 
Corruption Case White-Collar Criminal Position 
Prison 
Years 
Construction permission Gouravan, Mohammad City planning manager 1 
Construction permission Mahmood, Nasir Property developer 0,6 
Construction permission Mahmood, Tariq Property developer 0,6 
Recycling waste Gunnerød, Ralph Kevin Sales manager 1 
Public utility Hansen, Morten Director 0,25 
Police help out of prison Henriksen, Helge Entrepreneur 1 
Police help out of prison Isaksen, Sverre Police officer 2 
Police help out of prison Kollen, Ernst Ole Police officer 1,25 
School buildings Eide, Per Øyvind Entrepreneur 2,75 
School buildings Bastiansen, Ronny Entrepreneur 2,17 
School buildings Knudssøn, Jarle I. Entrepreneur 1,58 
School buildings Kjøllesdal, Jon Arild Entrepreneur 1,58 
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School buildings Nettli, Harald Project leader 5 
School buildings Pawlak, Jaroslaw Jozef Project leader 2 
School buildings Olafsen, Tor Åge Consultant 2 
School buildings Hauger, Arild Managing director 1 
School buildings Skjerven, Jens Erik Craftsman 1,5 
School buildings Dyrnes, Roger Klinge Entrepreneur 3 
Municipality buildings Ramstad, Per Arne City maint. manager 5,5 
Municipality buildings Ramstad, Nils Aage Construction builder 4 
Municipality buildings Ramstad, Anders Construction builder 3,6 
Municipality buildings Fjeld, Fredrik Construction builder 2 
Municipality buildings Hartmann, Terje Construction builder 2 
Municipality buildings Ramstad, Martin Petter  Construction builder 1,5 
Procurement of busses Tunold, Odd Gunnar Sales director 0,1 
Procurement of busses Dahl, Erik Terje Managing director 0,7 
Procurement of busses Helminen, Hannu Mikael Construction manager 0,7 
Procurement of busses Leite, Helge Chief Executive Officer 3,5 
Procurement of busses Ellingsen, Nils Aksel Technical Manager 5,5 
Procurement of busses Andersson, Erik Ernst Procurement Manager 5 
Procurement of busses Hagerup, Dag Sales Manager 5 
Procurement of busses Gaarder, Tor Entrepreneur 4 
Procurement of busses Øverbø, Knut Construction site chief 0,8 
 
Table 1: Convicted white-collar criminals in public procurement corruption 
 
Table 2 lists sources of detection for the seven corruption cases. The last three cases are based 
on whistleblowing. In the school buildings case, a person blew the whistle by contacting 
journalists in the daily Norwegian business newspaper Dagens Næringsliv. In the 
municipality buildings case, a whistleblower informed people in the internal control function 
about misconduct. In the procurement of busses case, an employee blew the whistle when he 
came home from vacation. Thus, 3 out of 7 cases were detected based on whistleblowing. 
Although the sample is small, whistleblowing is the most important source of detection in the 
sample. 
 
Corruption Case Source of Detection 
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Construction permission Competing property developer who 
discovered that corruption was involved 
Recycling waste Criminal friend in money laundering who 
was cheated 
Public utility Internal auditor in the organization who 
distrusted the director 
Police help out of prison Divorced wife who wanted to hurt her ex 
husband 
School buildings Journalists Gjernes and Skaalmo who 
received tips from city employees 
Municipality buildings Whistleblower to internal control in the 
organization 
Procurement of busses Employee on vacation in German read local 
newspaper about MAN corruption 
Table 2: Source of detection for white-collar public procurement corruption cases 
 
If we look at all the 390 white-collar criminals in Norway, we find the following list of 
detection sources in Table 3. In our database of 390 convicted white-collar criminals, we were 
able to identify crime detection sources based on media reports, court documents as well as 
personal inquiries. In Norway, there are no whistleblower awards. Therefore, we applied no 
separate crime detection source for whistleblowing. Instead, whistleblowers can be assumed 
to have contributed to several of the other sources in the table. 
 
 
Rank Crime Detection Source Criminals Fraction 
1 Journalists investigating tips from readers 101 26 % 
2 Crime victims suffering financial loss 47 12 % 
3 Internal controls of transactions in organization 44 11 % 
4 Bankruptcy lawyers identifying misconduct 41 11 % 
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5 Tax authorities carrying out controls 25 6 % 
6 Commercial banks controlling accounts 18 5 % 
7 Accounting auditors controlling clients 18 5 % 
8 Police investigations into financial crime 5 1 % 
9 Stock exchange controls of transactions 4 1 % 
10 Other detection sources 87 22 % 
 TOTAL 390 100 % 
Table 3: Detection of white-collar crime 
 
Tipster are often whistleblowers who provide tips to investigative journalists in the media. 
Tipster are typically also the source for internal controls and accounting auditors. Given that 
these three groups make out a total of 26+12+5 = 43 percent of detections, it can be assumed 
that most of the detections were caused by whistleblowers, since the last category of other 
detection sources also can be assumed to involve whistleblowers. 
We phrased the research question: What is the role of whistleblowers in detection of white-
collar corruption in public procurement? We found that almost half of all the cases were 
detected based on whistleblowing. Whistleblowers informed investigative journalist, internal 
control function person, and own employer. Therefore, this research indicates that 
whistleblowers are the most important source of detection of white-collar corruption in public 
procurement. 
 
7 Discussion 
As illustrated in the Norwegian sample as well as the U.S. cases mentioned below, the role of 
whistleblowers is important in detecting white-collar criminals in general and also in public 
procurement corruption. If the situation for whistleblowers was improved, we might expect 
that more white-collar criminals would be detected.  
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In recent times, corruption has become an issue of major political and economic significance 
when developing countries are trying to make their transition into becoming developed 
countries. In the past, bilateral donors, such as the United States, not only overlooked partisan 
self-enrichment on the part of developing country governments, they also supported many 
corrupt regimes in Africa and other parts of the world in return for bilateral relationships 
(Abdulai, 2009). 
Janet A. Garrison and Herb F. Hyman were procurement professionals who blew the whistle. 
During the course of their employment with public entities in Florida, they uncovered 
unethical procurement practices. They then became whistleblowers. In their jobs as 
government purchasers, both Garrison and Hyman believe that they are entrusted by the 
public to spend taxpayer dollars wisely and fairly. Each individual also notes that codes of 
ethics govern their membership in professional procurement associations, as well as their 
certifications: Thus, Garrison and Hyman felt it was their public and professional duty to 
report ethics breaches that clearly violated our nation's laws or specific procurement statutes. 
However, their efforts to "do the right thing" met with unanticipated outcomes, ranging from 
the mixed reactions of others to a complex maze of ongoing legal proceedings (Atwater, 
2006). 
Janet A. Garrison's whistleblowing experience occurred when she worked as a Purchasing 
Analyst for the Florida Department of Education (DOE). Back in 2003, she was asked to help 
develop a solicitation for privatizing about 174 jobs in DOE's Office of Student Financial 
Assistance (Atwater, 2006).  
For Herb F. Hyman, Procurement Manager with the Town of Davie, FL, his whistle-blow 
experience related to the purchasing practices of the Town Administrator, Christopher J. 
Kovanes. Hired by the Town Council as a contract employee, Kovanes was the town's top 
leader. Thus, Kovanes was Hyman's boss (Atwater, 2006). 
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It is often argued that detection of white-collar crime is low and that detectors are reluctant to 
blow the whistle. Social conflict theory might support this argument in that the elite does not 
really want to punish their own. According to social conflict theory, the justice system is 
biased and designed to protect the wealthy and powerful. The wealthy and powerful can take 
substantial assets out of their own companies at their own discretion whenever they like, 
although employed workers in the companies were the ones who created the values. Similarly, 
public officials can abuse their positions for personal gain. As Haines (2014: 21) puts it, 
financial practices that threaten corporate interests, such as embezzlement, are clearly 
identified as criminal even as obscenely high salaries remain relatively untouched by 
regulatory controls”.  
Conflict theory is a perspective in criminology that emphasize the social, political, or material 
inequality of a social group (Seron and Munger, 1996), that draw attention to power 
differentials, such as class conflict.. Crime stems from conflict between different segments of 
society fueled by a system of domination based on inequality, alienation, and justice. Crime is 
harm that comes from differences in power (Lanier and Henry, 2009). 
Conflict is a fundamental social process. Society is largely shaped by the competing interests 
of social groups who struggle for dominance in order to enact or maintain a social structure 
most beneficial to them (Petrocelli et al., 2003: 2) 
Conflict theory asserts that the relative power of a given social group dictates social 
order in that powerful groups not only control the lawmakers, but also the law 
enforcement apparatus of the state. In essence, laws are made which serve the interests 
of the privileged, and the police are used to suppress and control any segment of 
society that poses a threat to the status quo. 
According to conflict theory, economic inequalities and repression lead to deviant behavior. 
Laws, law breaking, and law enforcement are factors that evolve from and contribute to social 
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conflicts, and strengthen the dominant position of powerful individuals. Laws tend to penalize 
behavior of certain classes, and not individuals, because it is the more powerful classes that 
are in a position to pronounce certain actions as illegal. The ruling class is faced with the 
decision, which values to enforce when making laws. Criminal law plays the role of a social 
control mechanism. Certain types of conduct are prohibited, and certain kinds of sanctions are 
imposed for their infringement.  
In addition to conflict theory, public service motivation theory should inform future research 
into white-collar crime in the public sector and public procurement. Because the theory 
speaks to the motivations of individuals who choose to work in the public sector, it could 
explain why some public sector employees will become whistleblowers despite the risks 
inherent in doing so, while other public sector employees will either ignore the corruption or 
attempt to profit from it themselves. 
 
8 Conclusion 
The role of whistleblowers is important in detecting white-collar crime, as evidenced by our 
study sample as well as some cases. Whistleblowing seems to be the most important source of 
detection, particularly with regard to public procurement. Despite the procedures and 
protocols established to protect the procurement process from corruption, bad actors have 
been found at all levels of government. While audits and other checks and balances are useful 
in exploring claims of corrupt procurement practices or the fraudulent award of contracts, 
these are insufficient in the initial detection of corruption. To detect more crime, 
whistleblowing has to be encouraged and revenge and retaliation need to be prevented. This is 
no easy feat, as whistleblowers have few protections and generally suffer large reputational 
and financial losses. The ruling class in society has the power to define certain behavior as 
deviant, while the ruled class might be of a differing opinion about what is right and what is 
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wrong. Criminal laws are established mainly for the protection and development of the 
institutions of capitalism. Through laws, the powerful class exercises its power and controls 
the resources. 
The unique contribution of this research can be found in the empirical side of public 
procurement corruption. A managerial implication is that whistleblowing should be further 
enhanced, while at the same time discouraging false accusations. A theoretical implication 
can be found in future research that may focus on the links between public service motivation 
theory and whistleblowing for detection of public procurement corruption. 
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